ISO 27001

Penetration testing under ISO 27001: expected by risk, judged by evidence.

The standard never says you must commission a penetration test. Yet almost every certified company runs one, because three Annex A controls are hard to evidence without it. This page explains which controls pull testing in, what a certification auditor reads in your report, and how to place tests so each audit finds them fresh and closed out.

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01 · Where it comes from

Three controls that pull testing into the ISMS

Your risk assessment decides the depth; these controls decide the topic.

ISO 27001 works through risk. You decide what testing is proportionate, record that decision in the Statement of Applicability (SoA), and then the auditor holds you to it. Three controls in the 2022 Annex A are where that decision usually lands.

  1. A..1
    8.8 Management of technical vulnerabilitiesFind weaknesses in the systems you run, judge how exposed you are, and act in good time. Scanning answers the routine part; a test shows whether weaknesses can be chained.
  2. A..2
    8.29 Security testing in development and acceptanceNew and changed systems are tested for security before they go live. For a product company, this is where an application test before a major release belongs.
  3. A..3
    5.35 Independent review of information securityYour approach to security is reviewed by someone outside the work, at planned intervals and after major change. An external test is one input to that review, not the whole of it.

Two neighbours matter too: 8.34, on protecting live systems while audit or test activity runs, and 8.25, the secure development life cycle that 8.29 sits inside. Our pages on vulnerability management and secure development cover each control in full.

02 · What auditors accept

What a certification auditor accepts as evidence

They sample the trail, from scope to retest, against what your own documents promise.

  • A scope that matches the ISMS. The systems tested sit inside the scope statement, and the in-scope assets left out are explained by risk, not by budget alone.
  • Tester independence. The people testing did not build or run what they tested. An internal team can qualify if it is organisationally separate.
  • A dated report. Method, dates, the environment used, findings with severity, and who did the work.
  • Findings in your process. Each finding appears in your vulnerability or risk tracker, with an owner and a due date set by your policy.
  • Remediation or a decision. Fixed through change control, or formally accepted by the risk owner with a reason recorded in the risk treatment plan.
  • Retest proof. A retest letter, an updated report, or documented internal verification for each closed high-severity item.

The auditor does not grade the tester's exploits. They want to see that your ISMS took the report in and acted on it. A clean report with no follow-up record is weaker evidence than a report full of findings that were each handled on time.

03 · Test types

Pen test, vulnerability scan, red team: what each one proves

Three activities, three different questions answered.

ActivityWhat it answersTypical rhythmWhere it lands in the ISMS
Vulnerability scanWhich known weaknesses exist on our assets right now?Commonly weekly to monthly, automated8.8 routine evidence; feeds the risk register
Penetration testCan a skilled person turn those weaknesses into real access?Commonly yearly and after major change8.8, 8.29, and an input to 5.35
Red team exerciseWould we notice and respond to a determined, goal-driven attacker?Occasional, for mature programmesTests detection and incident management; optional for most

A scan alone rarely satisfies an auditor for an internet-facing product, and a red team is not a substitute for routine scanning. Most small and mid-size ISMS scopes need the first two and can skip the third.

04 · Common findings

Where testing evidence usually falls short

The test happened. The record around it is what fails.

  • Scope set by the tester. The tester picked what to test and nobody checked it against the ISMS scope statement.
  • No link to risk. Critical findings never reached the risk register, so the risk picture the auditor reads is out of date.
  • Risk accepted by the wrong person. An engineer marked a finding as accepted; only the named risk owner may do that.
  • Release testing undocumented. Security checks before go-live happened in conversation, so control 8.29 has no evidence.
  • Production put at risk. Testing ran against live systems with no agreed window or rollback plan, which control 8.34 is meant to prevent.

Each of these is cheap to fix before the audit and awkward to explain during it. A one-page test plan signed by the ISMS owner, naming scope, window, contacts and how findings enter the tracker, closes most of them.

05 · Scheduling

Placing tests against the audit cycle

Time the test so that the fixes land before the auditor arrives.

  1. Before Stage 2

    Run the first full test early enough to remediate and retest.

    What happens
    • Agree scope from the ISMS scope statement
    • Book the retest at the same time
    You get
    • A closed-out report for the certification audit
    Good practice
    • High findings closed, the rest planned with owners
    Watch for
    • A test that finishes the week before Stage 2
  2. Surveillance years

    Repeat on the rhythm your policy states.

    What happens
    • Refresh scope for new products and infrastructure
    • Track findings through the same tracker
    You get
    • Evidence that the control operates every year
    Good practice
    • Trends across reports shown at the management review
    Watch for
    • Copying last year's scope without checking it
  3. After significant change

    A new platform, a migration or a major release triggers a test or a recorded decision.

    What happens
    • Log the change
    • Decide test or no test, with a reason
    You get
    • A defensible link between change and testing
    Good practice
    • The decision sits in the change record
    Watch for
    • Silent skips

Sources: ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A control titles 5.35, 8.8, 8.25, 8.29 and 8.34 (titles only; the standard's text is not reproduced); ISO/IEC 17021-1 on the certification cycle of initial audit and annual surveillance. Testing rhythms marked "commonly" are market practice, not requirements of the standard.

Questions about pen testing for ISO 27001

Can we pass the certification audit without any penetration test?

Possibly, if your risk assessment justifies it. Expect hard questions.

The standard does not name the activity. If your risk assessment and SoA explain why scanning, code review and configuration checks give enough assurance for your exposure, an auditor may accept that. For an internet-facing product holding customer data, that argument is difficult to make.

Does the auditor want to see the full report?

Usually they review it on screen and sample findings.

Most auditors ask to see the report during the audit rather than keep a copy. They pick findings and trace each one into your tracker, change records and retest. Agree the handling of sensitive detail with the certification body in advance.

Can our own engineers do the test?

Only if they are independent of what they test.

An internal security team that is separate from the developers and operators can provide independent testing. Engineers testing their own work cannot. Many companies use an external tester for the yearly test and internal staff for release-time checks under 8.29.

We also need a test for SOC 2. Can one test serve both?

Yes, if the scope covers both boundaries.

One test can serve both audits when its scope covers the ISO scope statement and the SOC 2 system boundary, and its date falls where both need it. Our page on penetration testing for SOC 2 covers the SOC 2 side.

Get a test your auditor can trace.

Auditify scopes penetration tests to your ISMS boundary and hands over a report built for the follow-up trail the auditor samples.